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Afghanistan is once again facing a deteriorating security situation. In 
Helmand, the country’s largest province, the Taliban were able to make 
significant inroads and seriously challenge Afghan security forces. To make 
the situation even worse, the military successes of the Jihadist insurgent 
groups come at a time when the national government suffers from internal 
conflicts, deepening the existing rift between Afghanistan’s leading political 
figures, President Abdullah Abdullah and the Chief Executive of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani. Considering the resurgence of the 
Jihadist insurgents and the fragile domestic political structure, New Delhi 
offered Kabul “full support for boosting Afghanistan’s defence capabilities to 
preserve its unity and territorial integrity”. During a four-day visit, Afghan 
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qadam Shah Shahim and other senior 
officers discussed potential support with Indian military leaders’, ranging 
from strengthening military ties to intensifying defence cooperation between 
the countries. At the moment, India trains nearly 800 Afghan soldiers in 
various military facilities every year, and delivered four Mi25 attack 
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helicopters to Afghanistan in December 2015. However, it is obvious that the ‘wish list’ of 
Afghan’s COAS is longer and it would most likely include “attack helicopters, utility 
helicopters, tanks, artillery and ammunition, as well as training for more Afghan forces”. 
Taking into account the genesis of terrorism in the country, it should be no surprise that it 
coincides with enhanced military and defense cooperation between New Delhi and Kabul. 
Afghanistan is witnessing an extraordinary response by the Taliban in the form of large-scale 
terror attacks. Nevertheless, this phenomenon raises important questions: 
Firstly, can one state that the recent series of Jihadist attacks in the country’s capital city is a 
reply by the Taliban to the announcement of further military cooperation between the Afghan 
government and India?  
When analyzing this conundrum, it appears that the timing of the latest attacks is definitely a 
pointing to a correlation between the recent increase of Taliban activities and the military 
cooperation between Kabul and New Delhi. However, this is only one of at least four factors 
influencing Taliban activity. The terror attacks also have to be seen in the context of the 
growing presence of the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan which is increasingly challenging 
the position of the Taliban. In this context, one should mention that IS was able to capitalize 
on the emerging factionalism and internal power struggles within the Taliban after the death of 
Mullah Omar -the spiritual leader of the movement- was officially acknowledged. IS presence 
is certainly also a cause for the ongoing terror attacks, since the internal power struggle 
continues. The ongoing militant activities are a way for the new Taliban leadership to show 
strength and capabilities and assert its position within the country’s insurgency sector. Last but 
not least, taking recent Taliban statements into account - warning India against offering 
military support to the Afghan government- it is clear that the Jihadists consider India not only 
as a partner of US interests in Afghanistan but also as its potential successor in the region and 
is therefore a primary target. As such, the last Taliban attacks in Kabul are not only directed 
against the Afghan government but are also a signal to New Delhi to stay out of the country, 
and that India like US (and other NATO forces) are identified as a hostile foreign influence.  
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Secondly, assessing the precarious relations between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the 
following question appears: Is there a need for Kabul to balance its ties with India and 
Pakistan?  
Taking the developments of the past 15 years into account, there is not much room to 
maneuver for Kabul, as long as Pakistan’s conservative security circles seek to influence 
Afghan’s domestic policy via militant proxies. Pakistan’s double game, officially supporting 
the international “war on terror” and its covert state-sponsorship of Jihadists is an obvious 
contradiction in Islamabad’s public rhetoric that it wants a stable, peaceful and prosperous 
Afghanistan. In consequence, closer ties between Kabul and New Delhi is not only the result 
of a decades-long friendship between the countries but also logical consequence of Pakistan’s 
Afghanistan approach. However, considering the lacking economic performance of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and virtually non-existent regional cooperation, both countries must 
work towards a normalization of their bilateral relations. The bloody border tensions over the 
construction of a fence and a gate at Torkham during the summer, shows that there is a high 
probability that an armed conflict could take place and focus attention on the disastrous 
economic losses that occur due to this to non-cooperation. 
Thirdly, what are the main causes of the growing Jihadist insurgency in Afghanistan? 
Basically, one can identify two main rationales behind the increased Jihadist militancy in the 
country: In domestic terms, there is the unwillingness of the Taliban to enter severe and 
sustainable peace negotiations. Having said this, one has to be aware that the Taliban 
movement, at its core, is a deeply anti-democratic force and it considers any consensus based 
decision-making structure as dangerous for the survival of the movement. In other words, a 
regular, formal participation in the current political-administrative system is perceived as a 
threat for the Taliban coherence since it would undermine its leadership structure. In this 
context, one has also to state that the current Afghan constitution is incompatible with the 
ideology of the Taliban and must be rejected from their radicalized Islamist point of view. 
Subsequently, Taliban identify military resistance against the contemporary institutional setup 
as the only way forward. The fact that the Taliban is primarily a military organization build on 
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mercenary structures supports their belief that violence as the only mechanism of conflict 
solution.  
The second reason for the increase in terrorist attacks is the ‘international dimension which 
becomes clear in the following indicators: Firstly, the unrealistic Taliban demand to withdraw 
of all foreign troops from Afghan soil as a precondition for peace negotiation. Secondly, 
Pakistan interference in Afghan politics, especially its ongoing sponsorship of groups carrying 
out terror activities in neighboring countries. Despite Pakistan’s efforts to fight militant groups 
within its own borders, one must state that these campaigns mainly target elements that pose a 
threat to the Pakistani state and society. Pakistan based terrorists operating in Afghanistan or 
India are largely spared from any actions by Pakistan’s security forces. As such, one must state 
that Pakistan continues its traditional politics of using proxies to ensure its security- and 
foreign policy (power) orientated interests in the region.  
Final thoughts 
Pakistan perceives any Indian activity in Afghanistan as a challenge to its own interests and 
security. Against this backdrop, an increase in defence cooperation between New Delhi and 
Kabul will most likely provoke harsh reaction among Pakistan’s security circles. In the eyes of 
the Pakistanis, Indian support for the build-up of Afghan armed forces will not only directly 
improve New Delhi’s leverage within Afghan’s security sector –an upgrade from the previous 
soft-power approach- but also indirectly since more sophisticated weapons and training for the 
Afghan military might contribute to weakening the Taliban and other pro-Pakistani militant 
forces like the Haqqani Network.  
To conclude, one must mention that Pakistan perceives India’s activities in Afghanistan as a 
cover for anti-Pakistan operations, it especially links these measures with the proclaimed 
Indian goal to destabilize Balochistan province and other areas, and to sabotage major 
development projects on Pakistani soil. Against this backdrop, as long as Islamabad regards 
New Delhi’s engagement in Afghanistan as an attempt to weaken Pakistan instead of a serious 
effort to rebuild its western neighbour, more and more terror will be the norm rather than the 
exception.   
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